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Abstract
This article analyzes the historical continuity between the opposition of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) to the
Fairness Doctrine (1949) and to the contemporary Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Open Internet principle,
net neutrality. These debates demonstrate how media policy discourse has shaped democratic ideals, including by desig-
nating whose voices are or are not included in broadcast and digital communication spaces. The discourse emerging from
both media policy debates reveals that fears concerning cultural hegemony and the diversity of expression in the United
States have intertwined with fears concerning the invasion of foreign ideologies. The article then considers the possibility
of reconciling religious and secular discourse in the mediated public sphere.
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1. Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) net neu-
trality rules (2017, para. 2) aim to ensure the Open Inter-
net by prohibiting Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from
blocking access to legal content, applications, or services;
throttling lawful Internet traffic; and favoring Internet
traffic that benefits their own interests. Robert McChes-
ney’s (2007, pp. 184–185) characterization of net neutral-
ity provides a useful framework for analyzing the opposi-
tion of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) to both
net neutrality and the Fairness Doctrine:
The story was too often miscast in the press as a cor-
porate clash of the titans—Google versus AT&T, or Ya-
hoo! versus Verizon—when the real story was the un-
precedented involvement in amedia policy issue from
the grassroots.
Observingmedia policy debates at the grassroots reveals
not only how actors directly effect change, but the ways
in which media policy discourses have shaped demo-
cratic ideals, including by designating whose voices are
or are not incorporated into broadcast and digital com-
munication spaces.
Evangelical broadcasters and leaders formed the
NRB in 1944 in response to the influence of the Fed-
eral Council of Churches, now the National Council of
Churches, which convinced United States radio networks
to deny evangelical broadcasters access to the airwaves
for failing to serve the public interest and use the air-
waves responsibly. As E. Brandt Gustavson, NRB Presi-
dent from 1990 to 2001, testified before the House (Re-
ligious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Noncommer-
cial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000,
2000, p. 20), the Federal Council of Churches had tried
to “strike an agreement with the networks and the large
stations in communities across the Nation to act as gate-
keeper for all religious programming”. These events pre-
ceded the Fairness Doctrine (1949), which formalized
this framework for broadcast communication through
two principles. Broadcasters had to: (1) cover controver-
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sial issues of public interest, and (2) provide balanced
accounts by allotting free time to opposing voices. It
was a response both to the dissemination of propaganda
on the airwaves abroad in Nazi Germany and Fascist
Italy, foreshadowing the rhetorical intertwining of me-
dia policy and allegedly pernicious Islamic ideology in
twenty-first-century NRB discussions about net neutral-
ity, as well as to racial and religious attacks at home,
such as those cultivated by the anti-Semitic priest, Fa-
ther Coughlin, in the early 1930s. The NRB, nonetheless,
characterized the Fairness Doctrine as censorship of reli-
gious expression.
The NRB praised the decision of Ajit Pai, the current
FCC chair, to regulate the Internet through a small gov-
ernment approach. In July of 2017, NRB President Jerry
Johnson appealed to the FCC to minimize Internet reg-
ulation and reduce Title II powers as a means of pro-
moting global Internet freedom (Johnson, 2017, p. 2).
The NRB has repeatedly argued against the use of Ti-
tle II to regulate ISPs (Parshall, 2014, p. 3). The connec-
tion to United States foreign policy in the NRB stance
on net neutrality traces back to its concern about the
Fairness Doctrine, which was also laced with Republican-
infused rhetoric about foreign policy. Discourse emerg-
ing from the net neutrality debates, drawing from the
possibility of a revived Fairness Doctrine and the con-
cerns NRB leaders had previously harbored about the
policy in the mid-twentieth century, reveals the fears of
the NRB about cultural hegemony and free expression at
home alongside peripheral fears concerning the invasion
of foreign ideologies.
2. Religious–Secular Conflict in Unites States Media
Policy
2.1. Theoretical Framework
José Casanova (1994, p. 53) wrote in his sociological anal-
ysis of modern religions that, “by the 1830s, evangelical
Protestantism, organized denominationally, had become
de facto the culturally, though not politically, established
American religion”. By the twentieth century, however,
the contributions of the NRB to media policy debates
demonstrate how an evangelical organization—that was
not even mainstream Protestant—had evolved to exe-
cute both cultural and political agency in the United
States. NRB leaders believed they could feasibly chal-
lenge the boundaries between secularism and religion
through the policies governing the radio and Internet, re-
spectively. NRB opposition to both the Fairness Doctrine
and net neutrality not only constituted explicit critiques
of media policy, but also tacit critiques of secularism in
the public sphere.
Charles Taylor (2007) argued that secularism arose
with the increase of alternative options of beliefs, as
well as with cultural shifts in ideas toward the religious
and the secular. Secularization, for Taylor, is therefore a
byproduct of religious processes. This distinction would
be important for NRB leaders who are critical of how
media policy is itself rooted in a legal, cultural frame-
work that seemingly treats secularization as replacing an
“enchanted world”. For example, Taylor (2011, pp. 35,
40–41) noted that legal formulas such as the religion
clauses in the First Amendment are built on tensions,
showing that “there is no such set of timeless princi-
ples that can be determined…by pure reason alone”
and without conflicts. Secular laws and cultures include
many different goals that often collide with one another,
which the disparity between censorship of free expres-
sion, as characterized by the NRB, and regulation of
content for the public interest, as characterized by the
FCC, demonstrates.
Taylor (2007, p. 451) detailed the ways in which re-
ligion is always secularizing, including through evangeli-
calism, which he characterized as, historically, “basically
an anti-hierarchical force, part of the drive for democ-
racy”. This characterization is perhaps a rather appropri-
ateway to frame howNRB leaders have understood their
role as protectors of conservative, fundamentalist views
in the public sphere, fighting for balanced, democratic
discourse through media policy. This article seeks to ex-
tend Taylor’s framework by probing, as theNRBhas done,
the position of all religious citizens in the United States
public sphere, including those who do not espousemain-
stream, conventional ideologies, and the role of media
policy in defining that position.
2.2. The Rise of the NRB in a Mediated Public Sphere
The NRB formed in the 1940s, uniting fundamentalist
groups as a direct response to the Federal Council of
Churches, which claimed to speak for all Protestants.
The opposition of the NRB to both the Fairness Doc-
trine and net neutrality is instructive of how it has chal-
lenged mainstream Protestantism through media policy.
By the mid-1940s, the NRB had become “the nucleus
of a vibrant media subculture both serving the growing
evangelical movement and popularizing its worldview—
developments that were hard won by forties commercial
religious broadcasters” (Hangen, 2002, p. 141). By 1947,
two prominent issues regarding conservative religious
voices on the radio had surfaced: first, whether religious
broadcasters, in particular, Christian station owners,
should be able to use controversial language in broad-
casts and editorial opinions; and second, whether con-
servatives were unfairly denied access to the airwaves.
Religious radio paved the path for evangelical voices
to enter the public sphere (Hangen, 2002, p. 158). Steiner
(2016, p. 184) has observed the ongoing role of radio in
evangelical culture: “even a generation after the dawn of
the digital age, the ‘old media’ of radio continues to have
a key role in setting the evangelical agenda”. Addition-
ally, religious radio has shaped the evangelical agenda
regarding media policy, as the legacy of the Fairness Doc-
trine debates have shaped contemporary NRB opposi-
tion to net neutrality. Ward (in press, p. 2) insightfully ar-
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gues: “NRB opposition to net neutrality arguably reflects
the fact that the ‘electronic church’ has, like the rest
of the media industry, become consolidated”. In other
words, religious media conglomerates would be able to
pay large fees that would increase in the absence of net
neutrality (Ward, in press, pp. 3–4), thereby explaining
why key actors in the religious media industry, such as
the NRB, might oppose net neutrality.
2.3. Negotiating Net Neutrality
The irony of NRB opposition to the Fairness Doctrine and
net neutrality, two policies that have protected or aim to
protect minority or non-commodifiable viewpoints, lies
in the history of the NRB as a disempowered collection
of voices that sought to carve its space in the mediated
public sphere. To further complicate that irony, the NRB
at points has supported net neutrality—when its lead-
ers believed the principle could transform in accordance
with NRB interests. For example, it joined the SavetheIn-
ternet.com coalition, formed by the Free Press in 2006,
as an advocate of free speech (McChesney, 2007, p. 184).
The NRB penned a letter to Chairman Sensenbrenner in
April of 2006 expressing its support for network neutral-
ity protections (Network Neutrality: Competition, Inno-
vation, and Nondiscriminatory Access, 2006). In May of
the same year, the NRB firmly supported net neutrality
alongside left-wing coalitions (S. 2686, Communications,
Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of
2006 (part II), 2006). During a 2006 Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee hearing, Frank
Wright, NRB President from 2003 to 2013, officially en-
dorsed net neutrality. Wright had submitted a letter to
the chairman, Hon. Ted Stevens, in support of the renom-
ination of Kevin Martin as Commissioner and Chairman
of the FCC, while acknowledging that the NRB and FCC
did not always coexist in perfect harmony: “While NRB
members have not seen every issue before the FCC go
their way, we have always found an open door to make
our thoughts and concerns known” (Nominations to the
Federal Communications Commission and to the Depart-
ment of Commerce [National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration], 2006, p. 41).
In 2010, one year before the escalation of the 2011
net neutrality debates, the NRB founded the John Mil-
ton Project for Religious Free Speech in response to al-
leged threats of anti-Christian censorship on new me-
dia platforms. One year later, senior NRB vice president,
Craig Parshall, discussed in a white paper report for the
Project how media policies of technology companies un-
dermined the First Amendment. Parshall characterized
the “Open Internet” as inadequate in addressing newme-
dia platforms, as well as filled with “broad, complex, free
market-inhibiting rules with vague standards of applica-
tion, and short on the provision of basic guarantee to
citizen users that their content will not be censored be-
cause their ideas are unpopular, controversial, or politi-
cally incorrect” (NRB, 2011, p. 4). The NRB (2011, p. 8)
sought greater regulation of new media platforms that
otherwise limited “lawful religious expression”.
Parshall also lamented the lack of support from the
ACLU in acknowledging “anti-Christian censorship” (NRB,
2011, p. 7). It supported new media regulation, but not
the particular iteration of net neutrality that already ex-
isted at that time (NRB, 2011, p. 7). Rather than em-
bracing regulation of ISPs, the NRB wanted government-
promoted, uninhibited speech built into the rules of new
media businesses, such as Google or Facebook. Citing
Rob Frieden, Professor of Telecommunications and Law
at Pennsylvania State University, Parshall contemplated
the lack of concern for free speech and religious expres-
sion in the FCC Open Internet rules: “his primary concern
is that the FCC’s rules should serve to ‘safeguard competi-
tion,’ admittedly an important principle, but at the same
time [it is] an approach that fails to recognize the funda-
mental free speech rights of citizen users” (NRB, 2011,
p. 8). He suggested that FCC regulation of digital media
businesseswould have to parallel government regulation
of public utilities (NRB, 2011, p. 13). In short, he declared:
“the actual provisions of the Order fail to implement any
real protections for free speech” (NRB, 2011, p. 29).
2.4. Fearing the Resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine
This fixation of NRB leadership on “free speech” traces
back to the Fairness Doctrine. The legacy of the Fairness
Doctrine within the NRB remains central to the means
by which its leaders have resisted net neutrality. For
decades after the Fairness Doctrine became law in 1949,
the FCC avoided disputes regarding whether religion was
even an issue of fairness (Gentry, 1984, p. 262). A handful
of cases in the late 1920s to the early 1930s contributed
to the rise of the Fairness Doctrine. By the postwar 1940s,
as Pickard (2013) has shown, a broadcast reform move-
ment that included religious organizations (and, in partic-
ular, liberal Protestants, led by Everett Parker), laid the
foundation for the Fairness Doctrine and other future
radio reform. FCC Commissioner, Clifford Durr, acknowl-
edged that United States radio at the time did not con-
sider the voices of many, including religious minorities
(Pickard, 2013, pp. 318–319). Hendershot (2011, p. 140)
has argued that the FCC was largely reactive by imple-
menting the Fairness Doctrine, passively responding to
only a few of the handful of citizen complaints. The Fair-
ness Doctrine was designed to fail, Hendershot (2011,
p. 18) added, “in part, because it was an attempt to
serve an inchoate idea of the public”. Pickard’s (2015,
p. 122) similar analysis of the Fairness Doctrine has con-
firmed that a “vague public interest obligation”, rather
than a concerted effort to fortify public interest stan-
dards, has shaped United States mass media industries
today. This ambiguous framework has particularly ne-
glected the voices of those who fall beyond the purview
of the public interest.
At the core of the NRB religiously-motivated argu-
ment against the Fairness Doctrine was the idea that
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broadcasters should receive First Amendment protec-
tion. In 1975, Reverend James Nicholls testified before
the Subcommittee on Communications against the Fair-
ness Doctrine. His frank testimony suggests that the bat-
tle for religious expression on the airwaves, led by the
NRB, was not merely a fight for the freedom of uncon-
tested religious speech, but a far more complex religious
battle over the survival of less powerful Christian denom-
inations through mass media, very much reflecting the
marketplace of religion itself. Nicholls was represented
by Benedict P. Cottone, the lawyer for Carl McIntire
and a former advocate of the Fairness Doctrine. Cottone
had become a “strong opponent of the doctrine” (Hen-
dershot, 2011, p. 146). He mused on the problems of
the Fairness Doctrine for religious broadcasters who es-
poused “unpopular” religious or political ideologies, and
whom he characterized as “a frustrated minority…trying
desperately to get their voices heard” (Hendershot, 2011,
p. 325) but were afraid of being censored. Nicholls had
conducted a survey of the broadcasters at the 1975 NRB
Convention, as well as of the attendees at the annual
Christian Beacon Press convention (Fairness Doctrine,
1975, pp. 318–319). From this survey, Reverend Nicholls
claimed to have discovered that, of these respondents,
73.3% believed the Fairness Doctrine abridged the First
Amendment; 80% believed the Fairness Doctrine lim-
ited speech in broadcast media; and 73.3% believed the
Fairness Doctrine censored speech in America, broadly
speaking (Fairness Doctrine, 1975, pp. 332–333). The
rigor of his study is indeterminable, but his attempt to
offer these findings as evidence suggests he recognized
the NRB as a representative, if not central, example of
conservative, evangelical public opinion.
FCC chairman Mark Fowler, whose goal was “to elim-
inate government action that infringes the freedom of
speech and the press” by creating an unregulated, free
market (Jung, 1996, p. 32), appealed to theNRBon Febru-
ary 9, 1982, for its support to repeal the doctrine: “spec-
trum scarcity has been used as an excuse to regulate,
not a reason!” (Jung, 1996, p. 40). He viewed the pol-
icy as excessive government intervention and character-
ized spectrum scarcity as a facade constructed by an anti-
religious FCC. Between 1983 and 1985, broadcasters and
media organizationsmore publicly opposed the doctrine,
concerned about appealing to the largest public possible
rather than minority voices, such as those of the NRB,
whose unpopular ideas were less commodifiable for ad-
vertisers (Jung, 1996, p. 108).
Nonetheless, the legacy of the Fairness Doctrine did
not die with the 1987 repeal but intensified during the
2011 net neutrality debates, thereby demonstrating the
cultural and legal significance of radio to the NRB. In this
year, the NRB consistently published press releases to
its official Web site denouncing net neutrality. NRB Pres-
ident Frank Wright (2011, para. 2) penned a letter imply-
ing that, in the heat of the net neutrality debates, the
NRB was largely concerned about the Fairness Doctrine
resurfacing in other arenas: “Now that the letter of this
rule has been eliminated, NRB stands ready to work with
you to ensure that the spirit of the Fairness Doctrine does
not creep into other rules or proceedings”.
Fear within the NRB resurfaced with the Fairness in
Broadcasting Act of 1993. A Democratic representative
from North Carolina, W. G. Hefner, advocated for the
amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 by sup-
porting the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine with
his Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1993, much to the dis-
tress of the NRB. The NRB did not know that just a few
years later, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 would
effect an even more monumental overhaul of media law
since the Communications Act of 1934, one thatwould de-
crease the number of independent syndicators and, con-
sequently, lesser known preachers (Ward, 2009, p. 94).
E. Brandt Gustavson, NRB President from 1990 to
2001, opposed the reinstatement of the Fairness Doc-
trine before the House in 1993 (Broadcasters and the
Fairness Doctrine, 1993, pp. 39–41). He attempted to
reconfigure the public sphere as the participation of
the most number of people, including minority voices,
rather than the participation of the most while account-
ing for themaximumnumber of interests at one time. He
claimed that since the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine,
small religious stations had flourished, benefitting the
nation by removing barriers to free exercise of religion
and discussion of controversial issues (Broadcasters and
the Fairness Doctrine, 1993, p. 39). However, he warned
that government interference with religious broadcast-
ing remained due to the “cultural environment” in which
“many traditional topics of religious teachings” had “be-
come highly controversial” (Broadcasters and the Fair-
ness Doctrine, 1993, p. 39). Gustavson’s understanding
of “traditional” resided at the core of the issue, that is,
whether non-traditional religious identities needed to
conform to the mainstream values of the public sphere.
In an NRB white paper submitted for this hearing,
“Statutory Reimposition of the ‘Fairness Doctrine’ Would
be Unconstitutional”, the NRB praised the increase of
direct citizen participation through radio call-in formats
“that was never before possible” (Broadcasters and the
Fairness Doctrine, 1993, p. 40), following the repeal of
the Fairness Doctrine. This priority within the media pol-
icy agenda of the NRB demonstrated that it was con-
cerned with unveiling the discussion of private matters:
“sexual morality, marriage, parental responsibility, and
the sanctity of human life are now hotly contested by an
increasingly secularized society” (Broadcasters and the
Fairness Doctrine, 1993, pp. 40–41). In a 2007 updated
version of this white paper with the same title, Frank
Wright, then NRB President, even went so far as to pre-
dict that, should the Fairness Doctrine resurface, it could
lead to a “continuing state surveillance” that ensured re-
ligions broadcasters adhered to the fairness guidelines:
“such a pervasive ‘entanglement’ of government regula-
tors into the speech of religious entities would be incom-
patible with the religious liberties protected by the First
Amendment” (NRB, 2007, p. 12).
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Gustavson’s testimony (Broadcasters and the Fair-
ness Doctrine, 1993, pp. 39–40) showed that the NRB
tried to redefine the boundary drawn around the organi-
zation despite acknowledging that the religious commu-
nity was itself diverse and entitled to access to the air-
waves. He suggested unity amongst all conservative reli-
gious groups against their progressive counterparts:
In making this argument on behalf of religious liberty,
we would like to stress that NRB is not advocating
rights that are beneficial only to one side of a pub-
lic policy debate. In fact both sides of our Nation’s
cultural divide are well represented in the religious
broadcasting community….Both camps currently ben-
efit from their ability to have access to the airwaves
free of governmental oversight and supervision.
He rhetorically denounced the Fairness Doctrine as
“a government-mandated system of enforced fairness”
(Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine, 1993, p. 40),
and therefore a hindrance to uninhibited religious ex-
pression, which subsequent NRB rhetoric concerning net
neutrality would mimic. Edward J. Markey of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, nonetheless, assured
Gustavson that the Fairness Doctrine would not apply
to broadcasters wishing to present controversial view-
points regarding religious issues (Broadcasters and the
Fairness Doctrine, 1993, p. 66). Several years later, Gus-
tavson would testify in support of the Religious Broad-
casting Freedom Act and the Noncommercial Broadcast-
ing Freedom of Expression Act of 2000 against the FCC,
which had “overstepped its authority” by making deci-
sions that restricted the “fundamental freedom of reli-
gious expression” (The Religious Broadcasting Freedom
Act and the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of
Expression Act of 2000, 2000, p. 20). Gustavson chan-
neled anti-elitist, populist rhetoric, endorsing a more ag-
gressive approach to creating a religion-friendly, medi-
ated environment that accounted for religious minori-
ties when crafting media policies in the public interest
(The Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Non-
commercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of
2000, 2000, p. 21):
Thus, in effect, the FCC created a category of politi-
cally correct government-approved, religious speech
and that is abhorrent to us and unacceptable. Essen-
tially, the FCC seems to think it is permissible for pro-
grams to talk all about religion in academic or intel-
lectual terms but when the programs become more
passionate, emotional, personal or originates from a
church, it is somehow less educational, instructional
or cultural.
Nonetheless, the support of the NRB for these acts did
not avoid criticism. In a written rebuttal presented at
this hearing by a sociology professor and co-chair of the
Save Pittsburg Public Television Campaign, Starr argued
that the NRB was a predator, not a victim, since educa-
tional licenses were reserved for the whole community
(The Religious Broadcasting Freedom Act and the Non-
commercial Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of
2000, 2000, p. 60). Starr’s rebuttal suggests that, from
an outsider’s perspective, the NRB wanted to redefine
the “public sphere” to one that supported the rights of
the few to voice their opinions, even if it threatened the
well-being of the many.
2.5. Thwarting the Threat of Foreign Ideologies
One of the most powerful political allies of the NRB was
President George W. Bush. President Bush attended the
annual NRB convention in 2008, characterizing the Fair-
ness Doctrine as a question of the freedom of speech
and religion alongside a broader discussion of the World
Trade Center attacks. Bush characterized the prospect of
reinvigorating the Fairness Doctrine as “an effort afoot
that would jeopardize your right to express your views
on public airways” and require many programs to “meet
Washington’s definition of balance” (White House, 2008,
para. 9). He then shifted to discussing violent extrem-
ism in the Middle East, “the region of the world that
is the least free” (White House, 2008, para. 14) and
that cultivated the suicide bombers of September 11,
2001, “directly” (White House, 2008, para. 16) affecting
United States safety. Hibbard (2010, p. 196) has char-
acterized Bush at this convention as having portrayed
United States power as a “fundamentally benign force
in the world that is ‘[once again] called into action for
the defense of liberty’”. Hibbard demonstrated, through
this example, how the United States has systematically
garnered domestic support from groups such as the NRB
in order to justify its discourse and policies regarding
Islamo-fascism and dysfunction in the Middle East and
South Asia.
At the 2011 NRB Convention, attended by NRB ally
James Dobson and NRB President Frank Wright, John
Boehner (2011) adopted Bush’s 2008 rhetoric of free-
dom to criticize the Fairness Doctrine by amassing sup-
port for United States foreign policy. The merging of
religion and politics in the rhetoric of Republican lead-
ers, a common tactic employed when communicating
with religious conservatives, seemingly persuaded an al-
ready defensive NRB that ideological and militaristic for-
eign invasion threatened the cultural, political center
of the United States. In addressing the national debt,
Boehner predicted that the FCC may serve “as Internet
traffic controller” and possibly run “roughshod over local
broadcasters” who had provided “free content” to their
communities for decades (Boehner, 2011, para. 22). In
discussing net neutrality, he linked the freedom of ex-
pression in the United States to the repression of free
thought and economic suppression of the national debt,
much as Bush linked his Fairness Doctrine speech to Is-
lamic suppression of free thought in the Middle East.
Boehner (2011, para. 57) claimed: “gone is our culture of
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independence—in its place, a cycle of dependence”. He
also strategically addressed a point of interest to theNRB:
the persecution of “religiousminorities in Iraq” (Boehner,
2011, para. 108), given the organizational identity of the
NRB itself as a persecuted religious minority within its
own homeland.
This point of interest provided a segue to discussing
net neutrality as an attack on the expression of reli-
gious minorities that would allow the FCC “free reign”
(Boehner, 2011, para. 21): “right now, freedom and free
expression are under attack by a power structure in
Washington populated with regulators who have never
set foot inside a radio station or a television studio”
(Boehner, 2011, para. 19). Boehner (2011, para. 24),
speaking on behalf of the House Republicans, encour-
aged the NRB to combat the FCC through Congress: “as
far as I’m concerned, there is no compromise or middle
ground when it comes to protecting our most basic free-
doms”. He furthermore connected this larger conversa-
tion to the Fairness Doctrine, “another threat to free-
domwith an innocuous name” (Boehner, 2011, para. 31)
and a “censorship scheme from the 1940s” that repre-
sented “Washington’s definition of ‘balance’” (Boehner,
2011, para. 32), that is, an attempt by Congress “to si-
lence ideas and voices they don’t agree with” (Boehner,
2011, para. 36). Although neither President Obama nor
Congress showed interest in reviving the Fairness Doc-
trine, the NRB welcomed Boehner’s critique of a gov-
ernment trying to regulate the media in order to craft
its own vision of a fair and balanced mediated pub-
lic sphere.
3. Conclusion
Jürgen Habermas (2011, pp. 25–26) recognized that, al-
though religious reasons are insufficient for substantiat-
ing arguments in the public sphere, citizens could trans-
late religious language of public reason in order to pro-
vide a common moral ground in the public sphere. This
framework for compromise suggests that the NRB failed
to effectively achieve its goals in broadcast and digi-
tal media policy because it neglected to translate its
religious discourse into the language of public reason,
while instead attempting to either restructure or even
eradicate media policy conflicting with its organizational
goals. Taylor (2011, pp. 36–37) disagreed with Habermas
by claiming that religious belief should not receive spe-
cial status over nonreligious belief, since these disagree-
ments could not be resolved through public reason. The
tension between these two approaches for reconcilia-
tion provides a theoretical framework for understanding
the connection between the Fairness Doctrine and net
neutrality in the history of the NRB.
The Fairness Doctrine fostered a media environment
in which diverging viewpoints remained distinctive but
balanced. NRB leaders’ resistance to net neutrality has
been seemingly non-rational but consistent with an en-
vironment of religious media conglomeration (Ward, in
press, pp. 3–4). Additionally, NRB discourse fused domes-
tic concern for freedom of expression with the militaris-
tic concern for freedom from foreign invaders, a tactic
frequently employed by Republican politicians in discus-
sion with conservative religious figures. Yet through gov-
ernment regulation, net neutrality protects NRB content
and delivery from both economic as well as cultural con-
straint, such as by preserving delivery of the content on
the NRBWeb site directly or, more indirectly, the content
of streaming video “intervangelist” preachers who have
replaced NRB-supported 1960s televangelists (Bekker-
ing, 2011, p. 105). Megachurches that have streamed re-
ligious services online raise new problems for ISPs seek-
ing to fairly implement net neutrality, such as the rise in
conflicts occurring between evangelical Christian broad-
casters and Islamic leaders, who feel their communities
are targets of this broadcasting (Wikle, 2015).
Secularism, according to Taylor (2007, p. 53), has not
displaced religion but rather constitutes a byproduct of
religion itself. Even prior to the rise of Habermas’s pub-
lic sphere, medieval reform in the Catholic Church tried
to reconcile the disparity between the elites and masses,
much as the Reformation challenged the status quo of
Catholicism, thereby secularizing societies using the very
fabrics of religion itself (Taylor, 2007, p. 82), rather than,
as the common narrative claims, supplanting religion.
The obligation to speak truthfully in the United States
press was partially rooted in religious beliefs, noticeably
in the significant Zenger (1735) trial that helped to shape
the First Amendment: “The Zenger case, then, was as
much a religious as a political or legal phenomenon”
(Nord, 1985, p. 15), demonstrating that religious and sec-
ular matters were, in fact, interlaced in language in the
emerging United States public sphere. Talal Asad (2003)
similarly noted that secularism is a byproduct of religious
endeavors, but he critiqued the Western, Christian lens
through which scholars have distinguished between re-
ligion and secularism, and which itself has a politicized
history. This history has contributed to a secular myth of
liberal democracy, excluding non-Western religions from
the discourse of public reason by embracing “only reli-
gions that have accepted the assumptions of liberal dis-
course” (Asad, 2003, p. 183). Asad’s critique is particu-
larly indispensable for future research on the place of Is-
lam in United States public discourse and media policy.
These critiques of secular discourse prompt us to
trace its legal, political, and cultural history in the United
States to reconsider precisely what secularism means
in media policy that organizes societies, shapes com-
municative practices, and governs public discourse. Con-
temporary media policymakers aiming to reconcile ten-
sions between religious and non-religious beliefs in the
mediated public sphere might consider whether a my-
opic engagement with secularism overlooks the inter-
twining of religious and secular concerns that have his-
torically shaped religiously-grounded freedom of expres-
sion cases, overshadowed by the secular victors. Such
heightened awareness could enable media policymak-
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ers to better understand the stakes that religious actors
perceive—justified or not—in media policy debates.
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